



The corpus of law texts surviving from tenth-century England reveals a society that sought 
to maintain public order without anything resembling a police force. Rather than envisioning 
order as the product of state coercion, the kingdom’s upper-elite legislators understood 
society to attend to its own ordering on a local scale through a mix of individual action and 
communal self-regulation. This tenth-century idealized legal order is unlikely to hold much 
appeal today; it combined alarmingly libertarian assumptions about the legitimacy of lethal 
male violence with a harshly punitive communitarian approach to theft, involving both 
routinized execution and theft-prevention measures that intruded heavily on the lives of the 
ordinary people. Yet there is much to suggest that this vision of order was rarely realized: 
that communal control meant this culture’s cruel fantasies of retributive justice often ended 
up yielding in the face of the more humane sentiments embedded in local interpersonal 
networks.  
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Public Order and State Violence: A View from Tenth-Century England 
Tom Lambert 
Across the tenth century, England’s ruling elite repeatedly gathered to consider how best to 
improve public order. The new laws that were promulgated in many of these open-air 
meetings, usually held on royal estates in the kingdom’s West Saxon heartlands, survive and 
provide an invaluable window on the way that well-informed contemporaries imagined the 
operation of policing and justice in their society.1 Though superficially the measures 
outlined in them appear conventional, the continual restatement of a handful of procedural 
prescriptions associated with the suppression of theft, on close inspection it is almost 
always possible to discern some significant innovation emerging from each law-making 
session: a seemingly small departure from precedent that, when thought through in 
practical terms, makes sense as an attempt to render local justice more effective. The 
legislative edict known as “III Edmund” was the first to specify punishments for failure to 
participate in the communal pursuit of thieves, for instance, while “I Æthelred” established 
strict and detailed rules governing which modes of proof defendants with poor reputations 
should be permitted to undertake.2  
Collectively, the corpus of laws tells a story of sustained legislative experimentation, 
sometimes crude and direct but more often subtle and imaginative, focused on what today 
would be termed “criminal” law. It shows that tenth-century kings, senior churchmen and 
the highest ranking secular noblemen judged it important to engage with the technical 
niceties of law-enforcement, crime-prevention and judgement as they were practised on 
the most local level. Though at no point did they attempt to legislate for the high-stakes 
land disputes that seem to have sapped a great deal of their time and energy, they sought 
through rule-making to bring the routine operation of community-based justice—matters in 
which men of their wealth and status would rarely have needed to involve themselves—
closer to an ideal of perfectly maintained order that they seem to have imagined everyone 
would recognize and accept. 
                                                          
1 Medieval historians now tend to cite Anglo-Saxon laws using the system of titles, abbreviations and clause 
numbers set out in Liebermann, Gesetze der Angelsachsen (hereafter cited as Gesetze). For the sake of clarity 
this essay uses the longer titles rather than the abbreviations, which typically results in references in the 
following form: II Æthelstan 20:1-20:7. Æthelstan is the name of the king under whom the law was issued, the 
II indicates which of the six surviving texts from his reign is intended, and the numbers refer to a passage from 
clause 20:1 to clause 20:7. All such citations are accompanied by direct references both to Liebermann’s 
edition of the original text (which usually remains the most authoritative) and to an accessible English 
translation, often that in Whitelock, English Historical Documents I (hereafter cited as EHD I) which is available 
online (www.englishhistoricaldocuments.com). However, the standard referencing system is common to all 
modern editions and translations, of which there are several, and English translations of all the texts referred 
to here can easily be found in Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings (covering laws up to 939) or 
Robertson, Laws of the Kings of England (covering laws from 939 onwards). The Early English Laws Project 
website (www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk) contains a database of editions and translations of law texts from the 
period. On assembly locations see Roach, Kingship and Consent, 67-9. 
2 III Edmund; I Æthelred; Gesetze I: 190-1, 216-21; Robertson, Laws of the Kings of England, 12-15, 52-5. 
3 
 
This sustained upper-elite interest in local order is somewhat surprising for the period but 
fits well in its political context. The tenth century saw the extension of the West Saxon royal 
dynasty’s rule so that it encompassed not only King Alfred’s (r. 871-899) “greater Wessex” 
but also the former kingdoms of East Anglia, Mercia, and Northumbria, which had spent the 
preceding decades dominated by Scandinavian settler societies.3 This agglomeration of 
territories, finally secured with the expulsion of the last Scandinavian king of York in 954, 
had crystallised as the unitary kingdom of England by the end of the century. Throughout 
the period, this growing polity’s increasingly multi-ethnic upper elite—the families who 
provided the realm’s ealdormen, bishops and abbots, and whose trans-regional 
landholdings gave them a stake in the kingdom’s fragile unity—had a practical interest in 
rallying the population behind a collective public order improvement project. Their 
sustained campaign focused on the persecution of thieves could be read as an effort to 
unite West Saxons, Mercians, Danes and Britons against traditional “enemies within”. The 
laws’ carefully crafted preambles show successive kings actively promoting an image of 
themselves as dutiful custodians of their people’s “peace” (frið); deeply concerned about its 
poor state (whether real or imagined we cannot tell), they were now the driving force 
behind the major collective effort that the kingdom’s leading figures had devised for its 
improvement.4 There can be no doubt that legislation was self-conscious royal image-
making, but it would be a mistake to think of it only in those terms, dismissing laws as 
empty political rhetoric. Their detail and ingenuity provide good reason to think that 
England’s law-makers approached the task of improving order earnestly. They made their 
legislative interventions in a spirit of down-to-earth idealism that renders the texts they 
produced particularly helpful for historians, in that they preserve a sense both of what the 
law-makers were hoping to achieve and of the practical obstacles they thought they needed 
to work around.5 
                                                          
3 This is something of a simplification. Western Mercia and northern Northumbria did not experience 
substantial Scandinavian settlement, and the extent to which tenth-century English kings exercised political 
control over Northumbria beyond Yorkshire is questionable. Indeed, it is likely that it was in this period that 
the northernmost part of Northumbria—Lothian, seemingly an ethnically English region—entered the orbit of 
Scottish kings. On the political context, see Molyneaux, Formation of the English Kingdom; Stafford, Unification 
and Conquest. 
4 On frið: Lambert, Law and Order, 207-10. 
5 This account of the character and interpretative potential of royal legislation is potentially controversial. 
Patrick Wormald, the dominant figure in the field of early medieval law throughout the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, presented legislation as a primarily ideological enterprise, stressing the absence of 
evidence for the surviving texts being consulted in practice. The classic statement of this case, framed in a 
wider early medieval context, is Wormald, “Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis”, but see also Wormald, Making of 
English Law, 477-83. This essay draws extensively on the more positive interpretation of laws’ usefulness as 
evidence for contemporary legal culture and practice offered in Lambert, Law and Order, 12-19, which itself is 
probably best understood as part of a broader historiographical reassessment, taking place in the last decade, 
of the orthodoxy that law texts offer us little access to social realities. See, for instance, Taylor, “Lex Scripta 
and the Problem of Enforcement”; Rio, “Introduction”; Heather, “Law and Society in the Burgundian 
Kingdom”; Innes, “Charlemagne, Justice and Written Law”; Roach, “Law Codes and Legal Norms”; Cubitt, “As 
the Lawbook Teaches”. (However, a great deal of this was quietly anticipated in Charles-Edwards, Early Irish 
and Welsh Kinship, 3-4, 17-20.) In the context of this wider literature it is important to stress that using laws as 
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In the present context it is important to stress that while these texts demonstrate sincere 
concern about problems with order, at no point was any institution remotely similar to a 
modern police force imagined as a way to solve them. This was not because tenth-century 
England was some sort of “stateless” society, characterized by the absence of centralized 
political authority. In fact, there is a strong historiographical tradition of arguing quite the 
opposite: pointedly insisting that late Anglo-Saxon England deserves the label “state” 
because of the unusual sophistication of its monetary system, its orderly structures of local 
government, its ability to impose taxation upon the population to pay for a standing military 
force, and the strong sense of national identity supposedly discernible in the prominence of 
ideas of Englishness in contemporary discourse.6 The precise chronologies of all of these 
aspects of the much-vaunted tenth- and eleventh-century “Late Anglo-Saxon State” are 
debatable, but there is no doubt that the English state had access to overwhelming coercive 
force throughout this period.7 The kingdom’s military apparatus, however, served as a 
means to secure political submission and was only very exceptionally repurposed as an 
instrument of social discipline. Our main source for political narrative, the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle, reports that in 952 King Eadred (r. 946-955) “ordered a great slaughter to be 
made in the borough of Thetford in vengeance for the abbot Ealdhelm, whom they had 
slain.”8  This is one of a handful of instances across the period in which kings can be seen 
launching punitive expeditions against their own populations in response to what we might 
classify as political violence.9 Yet however significant these occasional demonstrations of the 
state’s coercive potential may have been for the projection of kings’ authority beyond their 
heartlands, they are radically at odds with the laws’ assumptions about routine policing at a 
local level.  
Indeed, the laws promulgated in tenth-century assemblies make it fairly plain that instead of 
envisioning order as the product of state coercion, England’s upper-elite legislators 
understood society to attend to its own ordering on a local scale through a combination of 
individual action and communal self-regulation.10 Victims of offences, or those closely 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
evidence for law-makers’ assumptions about practice and their reforming ambitions does not require us to 
assume that laws were widely transmitted or routinely consulted in written form. In the absence of any explicit 
statements on the issue we can only assume that the laws issued in these assemblies were intended to be 
observed in perpetuity, unless repealed, but there is nothing to suggest an official, centralised record of the 
kingdom’s laws was ever maintained (as it was for later medieval statute law). Though we know that written 
copies were made and kept by senior ecclesiastical (and possibly also lay) aristocrats, it is plausible that 
legislative edicts reached the localities primarily by word of mouth—probably through oral promulgation in 
shire assemblies at which senior local figures were expected to be present—and that the changes they sought 
to introduce needed to become embedded in local custom if they were to exist in the long-term.  
6 See especially Campbell, “The Late Anglo-Saxon State”; Wormald, “Engla Lond”. Molyneaux, Formation of the 
English Kingdom, is a recent critical reappraisal  
7 Though the use of the term “state” in the medieval period has been much debated it is only a problem if 
unduly reified. See Reynolds, “Historiography of the Medieval State”. 
8 Cubbin, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: MS D, 44-5 (s.a. 952). Translation: EHD I, 223 (no. 1, s.a. 952D). 
9 See Molyneaux, Formation of the English Kingdom, 77-9. 
10 What follows summarises the conclusions drawn in Lambert, Law and Order, esp. chs. 3 and 6. See also 
Hudson, Oxford History, chs. 2, 4, 7.  
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associated with them, were expected to pursue their own grievances by bringing 
accusations against people who had harmed them. For the most part, the onus was on them 
to investigate offences, identify malefactors, and bring charges against them.11 
Disagreements over issues of fact in such cases were resolved on the basis of proof 
procedures that for the most part were weighted heavily in favor of free defendants, and 
judgements ordering some combination of the payment of compensation and the 
imposition of punishment were issued on the collective authority of the assembled local 
community.   
In the mid-tenth century these local assemblies were reconceptualized as a kingdom-wide 
system of “hundreds”,12 a word that could refer to a geographical subdivision of a county, to 
the monthly legal assemblies held by these areas’ free residents, or to those residents acting 
collectively in other contexts (a hundred could ride in pursuit of a thief, for instance). 
Though it has long been imagined that hundred assemblies constituted a state-run network 
of law courts, their business directed by a royal official known as the “hundredman”, on 
close inspection this vision of local assemblies as the bottom rung of a state administrative 
hierachy proves to be a mirage.13 The authors of our tenth-century texts felt no need to 
explain who hundredmen were, but an early twelfth-century attempt to render England’s 
native legal system comprehensible to its francophone settler-colonial elite is quite explicit: 
“one of the most substantial men shall preside over the whole hundred and be known as 
the alderman.”14 Justice was overseen by prominent members of local communities, and 
seemingly not by the “reeves” employed by kings (and other great landowners) to act as 
local agents. Indeed, the way that the laws imagine enforcement action being taken against 
fleeing thieves and others who refused to submit to their judgements underscores how 
hundreds and their predecessors were envisaged as communal entities: collective 
expeditions led not by the king’s reeves but by the “leading men” associated with the 
assembly concerned.15 
The practical business of maintaining order in the tenth century did not, then, depend in any 
significant way on personnel employed by kings. There was neither the equivalent to a 
                                                          
11 “Reeves” (revenue-collectors and farm overseers) who worked for the king and other great lords do, 
however, seem to have been expected to perform an investigatory and prosecutorial role in situations where, 
for instance, a thief was captured but induced his captor to cover up the offence in return for payment, 
thereby depriving the king or lord of a punitive fine. See VI Æthelstan 11; Gesetze I: 182; EHD I, 427 (no. 37); 
Lambert, Law and Order, 150-1. 
12 Or “wapentakes” in regions dominated by Scandinavian diaspora communities 
13 As argued in Lambert, Law and Order, 243-50. See Hundred Ordinance 2 and IV Edgar 8:1; Gesetze I:  192, 
210-12; EHD I, 430, 436 (nos. 39 and 41). For the opposing view—that pre-1066 England was characterised by 
a dense network of royal administrators who controlled local courts—see Wormald, “Lordship and Justice in 
the Earliest English Kingdom”; Campbell, “Some Agents and Agencies of the Late Anglo-Saxon State”. 
14 Downer, Leges Henrici Primi, 102-3 (c. 8, 1a). 
15 A good example is II Æthelstan 20:1-20:7; Gesetze I: 160; EHD I, 420-1 (no. 35). The introduction of sheriffs 
(“shire-reeves”), powerful officials with authority over entire counties, may have brought more law-
enforcement activities under direct state control in the eleventh century; see Lambert, Law and Order, 251-2. 
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professional police force, nor a state judicial hierarchy distinct from society itself.16 We 
should not suppose that Anglo-Saxon men and women were able to maintain a functional 
society because they had created for themselves a Leviathan, a state apparatus capable of 
suppressing people’s naturally selfish inclination to pursue their interests through violence. 
This is neither what they did, nor something that they imagined to be necessary for the 
maintenance of order. That such ideas have in the past been projected onto the period 
perhaps reflects the extent to which modern historians’ interpretative assumptions have 
been, and continue to be, shaped by a cultural environment in which human beings’ need to 
be subjected to powerful institutions of social control is taken as axiomatic.17 As Marilyn 
Strathern pointed out in 1985, we need to recognize that this supposedly universal truth 
about human nature is in fact an ideological position derived from “a model of social and 
human behaviour which belongs very much to the industrial west, as well as to state 
systems of government.”18 Though alternatives to this model are scarce in the modern 
world, dominated as it is by a nation-state framework rooted in early modern European 
political thought, more distant historical periods can offer a much richer diversity of ways of 
thinking about order and its maintenance. Radical imaginations seeking food for thought 
may well find medieval Europe holds just as much interest as the pre-colonial Global South 
in this respect. (Indeed, Europe’s deep seams of archival evidence and long national 
traditions of professional historical inquiry—however unappealingly conservative—have 
made this part of human history unusually accessible to open-minded non-specialists.) 
___ 
What positive lessons the example of tenth-century England has to teach us remain unclear, 
however. It certainly serves to disrupt the assumption that police are necessary, but any 
attempt to argue that order-maintenance practices developed for this predominantly rural 
society might sensibly be adapted for modern urban contexts would have a great deal of 
scepticism to overcome. And even if that were not an issue, the desirability of such a project 
would be questionable.  
The underlying problem is that most of the ideals that make the Anglo-Saxon legal order 
distinctive are at odds with modern sensibilities. For all that institutionalized state violence 
was absent, the assumptions about masculinity around which the early English legal world 
was arranged are shot through with violence in way that few would find palatable today. 
The laws anticipated that men would offend one another in a range of ways—taking or 
damaging their property, physically attacking or insulting them, interfering with people 
under their protection—and this would inevitably lead to violent, vengeful anger on the part 
                                                          
16 There were functional equivalents to state and private prisons, however: offenders who lacked the 
resources to pay punitive fines could be subject to penal enslavement, working off their debt on farms owned 
by the king or by privileged aristocrats, deterred from absconding by the threat of the death penalty. See 
Lambert, Law and Order, 284-5. 
17 See Lambert, “Anthropology, Feud and De obsessione Dunelmi”. 
18 Strathern, “Discovering ‘Social Control’”, 113. 
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of the victims of such public humiliations. (Though offences against women had the 
potential to elicit violent responses the expected avengers were their male protectors.) The 
law’s role was to provide an authoritative framework within which peace settlements 
incorporating the payment of compensation could be negotiated. The law recognised 
enraged men who resorted to violence hastily and thereby denied their adversaries the 
opportunity to make amends as a threat to order, but while tenth-century lawmakers did try 
to place legal obstacles in such figures’ paths they implicitly endorsed revenge killing as the 
ultimate sanction in cases where wrongdoers brazenly refused to compensate their victims. 
Indeed, in these scenarios retaliatory homicide was accepted as legitimate even when 
directed against other members of the original perpetrator’s family, though the model of 
socially responsible masculine conduct that the laws promoted stressed the importance of 
keeping conflict contained by targeting only those personally responsible. The 
compensatory peace-making ideals of tenth-century justice represent the obverse of an 
assumption that free men must remain, as they traditionally had always been, autonomous 
weapon-bearing men with a right to use lethal violence if they felt their honour demanded 
it. Their decisions about when, where and why to attack others might prove catastrophically 
ill judged, provoking reciprocal violence or incurring ruinous compensation liabilities, but 
law-makers seem to have accepted that these were their decisions to make.19 The 
anthropologist Paul Dresch’s formulation captures the situation well: our tenth-century 
texts, like the early modern Yemeni ones he was discussing, “assume a set of minor, often 
personal, sovereignties that in a pressing sense precede the law.”20 
These radically libertarian ideals coexisted with an authoritarian communitarianism that 
modern Western audiences would probably find equally difficult to stomach. Put bluntly, 
while openly harming other people in response to perceived affronts was a legitimate 
activity—indeed, a fundamental feature of a free society that needed to be upheld even as 
laws were framed to limit its disruptive effects—sneakily taking other people’s property and 
then lying about it was a different matter entirely. By acting secretly, thieves sought to 
make it impossible for their victims to bring charges against them; they sowed suspicion 
within communities, potentially turning neighbours against one another, harming not just 
their immediate victims but also the very fabric of society. Tenth-century laws do 
sometimes address matters unrelated to theft but not often; it is their one overriding 
concern and their aims remain consistent throughout: to maximise the number of thieves 
who were securely identified and punished, to ensure that as many of these as possible 
faced execution, and by these and other means to deter theft. In pursuit of this agenda 
potentially onerous obligations were imposed on ordinary people. They were to gather 
                                                          
19 See Lambert, Law and Order, 224-35. This interpretation was inspired at an early stage in its development 
by, and to an extent aligns with, that of Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation. However, the stress laid here on 
laws’ recognition of the legitimacy of violence goes beyond Hyams’s argument, which often frames feuding as 
a phenomenon law-makers sought to suppress and explains its persistence as the product of entrenched 
opposition from conservative elites. See also Hudson, Oxford History, 171-80 
20 Dresch, “Aspects of Non-State Law”, 152. 
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together to pursue and kill thieves whenever this was feasible. Neighbours were to monitor 
one another’s livestock, compelling those who acquired new animals to declare publicly 
from whom they had been purchased, and before which witnesses, so that buyers of stolen 
animals would be forced into making dishonest statements that, when discovered, would 
justify their execution. Every free man (women seem to have been excluded) was to find 
sureties who committed to pay a large fine should he commit an offence (theft is almost 
certainly what is envisaged) and flee the area, a sum that could only be reclaimed if the 
sureties hunted the offender down within a year.21 (The precise extent of the sureties’ 
liability was determined by the value of the offender’s life, but was substantial: 200 shillings 
for an ordinary freeman, well over a kilogram of pure silver if paid in coin or approximately 
200 sheep.)22 This last measure in particular would have represented a major imposition—
the acceptance of potentially crippling financial liabilities for others’ actions—and all were 
backed by threats of punishment for non-compliance.  
The actual punishment of theft occupied law-makers far less than the detail of procedural 
measures designed to ensure it happened, but our texts make it plain that it was a long-
standing principle that thieves should face execution, at least if they were caught in the act. 
Indeed, the harsh punitive ethos of late Anglo-Saxon law is now very well known to 
medievalists, having been emphasised heavily as one of the English kingdom’s impressively 
state-like qualities. This passage from Lantfred of Winchester’s Translation and Miracles of 
St Swithun, written in the early 970s, is often quoted by way of illustration. 
At the aforesaid time and at the command of the glorious King Edgar, a law of great 
severity was promulgated throughout England to serve as a deterrent against all 
sorts of crime by means of a dreadful punishment: that, if any thief or robber were 
found anywhere in the country, he would be tortured at length by having his eyes 
put out, his hands cut off, his ears torn off, his nostrils carved open and his feet 
removed; and finally, with the skin and hair of his head flayed off, he would be 
abandoned in the open fields, dead in respect of nearly all his limbs, to be devoured 
by wild beasts and birds and hounds of the night.23 
There is reason to worry about the representativeness of this passage. No law matching this 
description survives from Edgar’s reign (957-75) and it jars with the much less elaborate way 
execution is discussed in the tenth-century laws we can read for ourselves, where demands 
for unusually painful deaths are extremely rare.24 But it would be a mistake to dismiss it.25 
                                                          
21 Lambert, Law and Order, 269-73, 277-82; Hudson, Oxford History, 153-9, 169-72. 
22 On silver: Naismith, Medieval European Coinage, 193-5. On sheep: VI Æthelstan 6:2; Gesetze I: 176; EHD I, 
424 (no. 37). 
23 Lapidge, Cult of St Swithun, 310-13. 
24 A possible partial exception is IV Æthelstan 6:4-6:7; Gesetze I: 172; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest 
English Kings, 150-1. However, this passage survives only in a late eleventh- or early-twelfth-century Latin 
translation, and seems to represent a different version of the text from that which survives in an Old English 
fragment, so there is more room than usual to doubt whether its rules about gender- and status-specific forms 
of execution (drowning for free women, stoning for slave men, burning for slave women) were enacted by the 
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There is nothing to suggest that tenth-century law-makers would have disapproved of such 
a punishment—the cruelty is entirely in accordance with the constant and bitter hostility 
with which they persecuted thieves—and it could easily be that they only refrained from 
specifying elaborate forms of execution in their legislative edicts because they recognized 
that their demands needed to be acceptable to the local assemblies that would have to 
carry them out.26 That is, lawmakers may have thought such exemplary spectacles desirable 
for their deterrent effects but, conscious that inducing rural communities to kill their 
thieving neighbours was already a challenge, decided that demanding prolonged agonies in 
their general legislative pronouncements would not be helpful. This need not, however, 
have prevented enthusiastic members of the elite from trying to enact the laws’ underlying 
punitive ideals more fully in places where it was practical to do so. Winchester—the 
political, religious and military hub of the kingdom’s West Saxon heartlands—is exactly the 
sort of place we might expect local power dynamics to be heavily skewed in favour of the 
elite, leaving low-status individuals vulnerable to having cruel retributive fantasies visited 
upon their bodies.27 There is a strong possibility that a real episode of horrifying violence lies 
behind the circumstantial, if heavily stylised, story that follows in Lantfred’s account: a 
wrongly convicted robber somehow survives most but not all of these mutilations (his scalp 
and feet are spared, and one dangling eyeball is returned to its socket), and then has his 
sight and hearing miraculously returned to him after he seeks the intercession of St Swithun 
in Latin verse.28  
___ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
law-making council to which they are attributed, or were added to the text by a later editor with a lurid 
imagination. Rabin, “Capital Punishment and the Anglo-Saxon Judicial Apparatus”, 184-93, reviews the 
seventy-eight references to capital punishment in the surviving texts. 
25 As Lambert, Law and Order, might reasonably be accused of doing by not commenting on it. In early 
medieval historiographical terms, this essay’s main contribution is the way it attempts to reconcile passages 
such as this (which make Anglo-Saxon justice appear as something imposed by elites with the power to act 
arbitrarily and cruelly) with the communal vision of legal practice implicit in royal legislation. 
26 References to mutilation become more prominent in eleventh-century law texts authored by Archbishop 
Wulfstan II of York. In his official law code for King Cnut, however, mutilation features as an alternative to 
execution rather than as an additional suffering inflicted on someone sentenced to die. (From a salvific 
perspective it was a kinder punishment because it allowed the offender time to atone for his sins through 
penance and avoid eternal damnation.) What Lantfred describes has a different logic. However, in another 
unofficial text, which purports to record a fictional Anglo-Viking legal agreement a century previously, there is 
a reference to a rule permitting people to go to the aid of mutilated offenders only after three days. This rule 
seems to belong to the same moral world as the law described by Lantfred. For these passages: II Cnut 20:4-
20:5 and ‘Edward and Guthrum’ 10; Gesetze I: 132-4, 332-4; EHD I, 459 (no. 49); Attenborough, Laws of the 
Earliest English Kings, 106-7. For discussion, see O’Brien O’Keefe, “Body and Law”; Marafioti, “Punishing 
Bodies”; Wormald, Making of English Law, 125-8.  Richards, “Body as Text in Early Anglo-Saxon Law”, draws 
out how this early eleventh-century material contrasts with the way bodily injury is framed in earlier law texts. 
27 A more conventional inference here would be that tenth-century laws’ frequent threats of punishment 
against corrupt “reeves” (a term for a local agents employed by a lord or the king) imply that routine local 
justice was dominated by figures whose offices gave them readily abused powers to impose their will 
arbitrarily on ordinary people; see Wormald, “Charters, Law and the Settlement of Disputes in Anglo-Saxon 
England”, 164. My reasons for dissenting from this are set out in Lambert, Law and Order, 262-8. 
28 Lapidge, Cult of St Swithun, 312-15. 
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Perhaps the most obvious lesson we might be tempted to draw from this is an essentially 
functionalist one. The example of early medieval England may disrupt the assumption that 
public order is dependent on institutionalised state coercion, but it will do nothing to 
dissuade those who take it as axiomatic that human beings can only be induced to live 
together peacefully if there is some threat of violence compelling them to do so. From such 
a perspective the Anglo-Saxon legal order could serve as a nice illustration of the idea that if 
this necessary violence does not come from state institutions it must be found somewhere 
else instead. We could thus read public order in tenth-century England as created and 
sustained by violence: the product of a dominant conception of masculinity that shamed 
men who failed to react violently to public affronts, and of a moralizing discourse that 
constituted thieves in particular as threats to society, uniting communities in their 
destruction. Even viewed in such a way, the period could perhaps still offer inspiration to 
those willing to think radically and unsentimentally about alternatives to the twenty-first 
century nightmares of militarized over-policing and mass-incarceration than prompted this 
special issue. But whether innovative thought along these lines is likely to lead anywhere 
good is another matter.  
My own experience, at least, is that imagining future legal orders based on Anglo-Saxon 
ideals and practices can yield uncomfortably plausible but dystopian results. Tenth-century 
suretyship systems, for instance, were attempts to embed law-enforcement and crime-
prevention in social networks using economic rationalism: people were forced to ask their 
families and friends to underwrite their good behaviour financially. Such systems would 
probably be more practical to implement with today’s technology than they were in the 
face-to-face contexts for which they were originally created. One could imagine a 
compulsory state-run online social network in which “friends” mutually guarantee one 
another’s lawful conduct, such that whenever an individual is convicted of an offence all 
their guarantors assume shared liability for the fine imposed (in a criminal law regime 
reoriented towards financial penalties).29 My bleak fascination with this fundamentally 
authoritarian idea worries me slightly. The tenth-century legislative measures on which it is 
based have embedded in them, in various ways, the value system of the patriarchal, slave-
owning society that produced them; they were designed to make it possible to impose 
sanctions on socially isolated individuals who were unable to find sureties, and to make life 
much more difficult for the poor than for the rich. But the idea that these unappealing 
features could be designed out of a modern system refuses to go away, leaving nagging 
doubts about how just deeply our societies are wedded to the principle that individuals bear 
sole responsibility for their own criminality.30 
But fixating darkly on the possible revivification of old forms of intrusive social control is 
probably a mistake. A different perspective ultimately yields more humane lines of thought. 
                                                          
29 See Lambert, “Anglo-Saxon Law, Social Networks and Terrorism”. 
30 US felony murder doctrine suggests particular cause for concern on this point. See, e.g., Robinson and 
Williams, Mapping American Criminal Law, ch. 6. 
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The example of tenth-century England does not, of course, serve to confirm that the threat 
of violent coercion is the one true basis of public order. That the Anglo-Saxons may have 
imagined this to be so, in their own quite distinctive way, is not in itself a reason to accept 
the idea. Indeed, though we have no way of knowing for sure, we should probably suspect 
that the tenth-century lawmakers who believed that the problem of theft could be solved 
through increasing the effectiveness of their punitive legal regime, or that violence could be 
reduced by making it easier for families to take vengeance on the specific individuals who 
killed their relatives, were just as misguided as the modern American legislators who 
imagine that public order problems can be solved through the deterrent effects of 
increasingly severe prison terms. The more pertinent lesson may be that the principle of 
retribution—as something both rightful in itself and useful as a deterrent to wrongful 
action—exercises a strong cross-cultural appeal to humans, and that because of this human 
societies across time and space have often understood the maintenance of order in 
primarily retributive terms, both exaggerating the extent to which peaceful coexistence is an 
unnatural phenomenon that needs special explanation and failing to appreciate the 
significance of forces other than coercive violence that actively underwrite public order.31  
On one level, framing the matter in this way does not get us very far. It simply provides 
another angle from which tenth-century England appears unexceptional. As in many other 
societies, including our own, it seems that the conventional wisdom of the day held that the 
main force guaranteeing public safety was the threat of violence that ultimately 
underpinned both the compensatory and punitive sides of the Anglo-Saxon legal regime. It 
was therefore natural for those who sought to improve order to fantasise about the socially 
beneficial effects that would arise from fine-tuning the systems by which violence was 
brought to bear on wrongdoers: the fact of more efficient and severe enforcement would 
make this underlying threat of violence more real to potential wrongdoers, a bigger factor in 
their risk-reward calculations, and rates of offending would thus be reduced. Importantly, 
there is nothing to suggest that tenth-century lawmakers anticipated any objections to this 
logic from their audience. There is every reason to think the proposition that problems with 
order could be fixed by more systematically ensuring that wrongdoers faced retribution was 
widely persuasive. That is, it is likely that a popular fantasy of violently imposed order 
underlay elite attempts to realize it through law-making in the tenth century, much as it 
does in the modern world. We can perhaps glimpse this in our record of London’s response 
to the early tenth-century anti-theft campaign orchestrated by King Æthelstan (r. 924-39), 
described below, which shows the city’s leading figures zealously embracing the king’s 
objectives and establishing a series of local rules and institutions that went well beyond 
what his general legislation required.32 Where the tenth-century example offers a glimmer 
                                                          
31 Some anthropology I have found helpful on this theme: Scheele, “In Praise of Disorder”; Ewart, “Categories 
and Consequences in Amazonia”. 
32 See VI Æthelstan, Gesetze I: 173-83; EHD I, 423-27 (no. 37). However, it is worth stressing that this text 
attests only to enthusiasm in the abstract, and that the thieves it targets are imagined as outsiders; we cannot 
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of hope is in the many hints that when these fantasies became concrete decisions about real 
human beings—not faceless thieves and killers but people embedded in the same local 
networks as the decision-makers—assemblies baulked at their cruelty.  
___ 
The most striking example of this is King Æthelstan’s sustained campaign against theft, 
which has left us a series of five law texts.33 Traditionally, English law held that thieves who 
were caught in the act could legitimately be killed by those who caught them, and that if the 
captors chose not to do this themselves they were duty-bound to hand the thief over to 
someone who would. People accused of theft who either admitted the charge or failed in 
their efforts to make a valid denial faced fines and procedural disqualifications that would 
make it more difficult for them to deny future accusations, but they were not to be 
executed. Æthelstan’s first attempt at reform sought simply to make this existing system 
function strictly. Presumably because of a perception that local discretion meant too many 
thieves were being allowed to escape with their lives despite being caught in the act, a rule 
was established demanding execution in all cases where red-handed thieves were over 
twelve years of age and where the value of the goods they stole was over eight pence.34 
Likewise, the law on procedural disqualifications was set down in strict terms. Normally 
anyone accused of an offence was entitled to respond with a collective oath of denial: a 
mode of proof advantageous to the defendant in which innocence was established through 
a specified number of other community members swearing that his oath of denial was true. 
Æthelstan’s earliest law text seems to demand that if a defendant with even a single past 
conviction for theft wished to deny an accusation this option was not open to him. His only 
choice was trial by ordeal, a much less favourable mode of proof which involved either 
plunging a hand into boiling water or grasping a red-hot piece of iron: the finding of guilt or 
innocence turned on whether the resulting burn was judged “clean” after three days.35  
These initial efforts to insist on rigorous application of traditional rules were not judged 
satisfactory, however, so the king and his advisers embarked on a much more radical second 
round of legislation. The law was to change so that all proven thieves would henceforth face 
execution, regardless of whether they were caught in the act or convicted by other means.36 
To prepare the ground for this newly merciless regime a short-term amnesty was 
proclaimed, giving thieves the opportunity to make amends to their victims without 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
safely infer that the Londoners’ zeal for harsh punishment of thieves in theory meant they were sanguine 
about executing members of their own community in practice. 
33 See Lambert, Law and Order, 174-7; Wormald, Making of English Law, 291-308; Keynes, “Royal 
Government”; Roach, “Law Codes and Legal Norms”; Pratt, “Written Law and the Communication of 
Authority”. 
34 II Æthelstan 1; Gesetze I: 150; EHD I, 417 (no. 35). 
35 II Æthelstan 7, 26; Gesetze I: 150, 164; EHD I, 417, 422 (no. 35). See Lambert, Law and Order, 263. On ordeal, 
see Hudson, Oxford History, 84-7. 
36 IV Æthelstan 6; Gesetze I: 172; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, 148-9. 
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punishment before the new laws were enacted.37 The law-making elite even sought to limit 
their own power to intercede on behalf of thieves who came to them as supplicants, 
upholding high-status secular and ecclesiastical figures’ right to provide inviolable 
protection for a set number of days (precisely how many depended on rank) but declaring 
that once these periods had elapsed thieves were to die regardless.38  
It is possible that all this effort achieved something. Æthelstan’s successor, Edmund (r. 939-
46), can be found thanking his people for their efforts in securing the fri∂ (“peace”) they 
now enjoyed from theft, and attempting to move the law-making agenda onto violence.39 
But there can be no doubt that much of this anti-theft campaign was misconceived. Even in 
Æthelstan’s lifetime it was necessary to climb down from the demand that twelve-year-olds 
be executed—the minimum age was raised to fifteen—and reluctance to kill lightly 
presumably underlies the simultaneous raising of the value threshold for stolen goods to 
twelve pence.40 The law that all proven thieves who met these criteria should die, regardless 
of how their guilt was established, seems also to have turned out to be unworkable. When 
we next find lawmakers considering procedural disqualifications in late tenth- and early 
eleventh-century texts they are once again envisaging a world containing people who had 
previously paid ∂eofgyld (a fine or compensation for theft), who therefore needed to be 
prevented from swearing oaths of denial and forced to undergo trial by ordeal if they were 
accused of further wrongdoing.41 And indeed, even these procedural demands look like they 
may have been over-ambitious. The law code of King Cnut (r. 1016-35) allows oaths to be 
sworn by even by those considered untrustworthy, their poor reputations reflected in much 
more stringent parameters for success in these oaths rather than the insistence on ordeal 
familiar from tenth-century texts.42 Again, the most plausible implication is that local 
communities, acting in hundred assemblies, often proved unwilling to put their neighbours 
in a position where any vexatious accusation would compel them to undergo a humiliating 
and painful ordeal, necessarily suffering a third-degree burn, because of some half-
forgotten historic offence. 
It is easy to accumulate examples along these lines. We can find lawmakers insisting that 
fines and compensations be levied in full, again indicating anxiety that local discretion on 
sentencing was resulting in too much mercy and undermining the law’s deterrent effects. 
They can be seen having to go to ingenious lengths to work around the free man’s right, 
providing he had no record of dishonesty, to establish his innocence through a collective 
oath. (Despite its representing a major obstacle to successful prosecution, it was evidently 
                                                          
37 III Æthelstan 3 and V Æthelstan 3:1; Gesetze I: 168, 170; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, 
144-5, 154-5. 
38 IV Æthelstan 6:1-6:3; Gesetze I: 171-2; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, 148-51. 
39 II Edmund 5; Gesetze I: 188; EHD I, 428 (no. 38). 
40 VI Æthelstan 12:1, 12:3; Gesetze I: 183; EHD I, 427 (no. 37). See Rabin, “Capital Punishment and the Late 
Anglo-Saxon Judicial Apparatus”, 189-91. 
41 I Æthelred 1:2 and II Cnut 30:1; Gesetze I: 216, 330-2; EHD I, 458 (no. 49); Robertson, Laws of the Kings of 
England, 52-3. 
42 II Cnut 22:1; Gesetze I: 324; EHD I, 457 (no. 49). 
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thought dubious to attempt any reform that directly challenged this right, as the elaborate 
rhetoric of royal frustration that accompanied a short-lived attempt to impose internal exile 
on notorious but unconvicted thieves under Æthelstan shows.)43 We even have a handful of 
case narratives, preserved in documents relating to aristocratic landed property, which 
perhaps illustrate some of the dynamics that led to the amelioration of supposedly strict 
punishments.44  
The most famous of these, recorded in a text known as the “Fonthill Letter” (c. 899-924), 
allows us to see a minor nobleman named Helmstan escaping severe legal penalties through 
the intervention of his godfather, an ealdorman (a top-tier secular magnate subordinate 
only to the king) named Ordlaf who wrote the letter to explain his involvement.45 Helmstan 
was twice caught thieving. We know little of the first instance except that he was convicted 
of stealing a belt—whether he paid a fine for this act, as the laws suggest he ought to have 
done, is not stated—but the fact of his conviction prompted one of his rivals to reopen an 
inheritance dispute, pressing his claim to the Helmstan’s estate at Fonthill. It seems that 
Helmstan’s status as a proven thief had (as the laws suggest it ought) negative 
consequences for his ability to defend himself legally; his patron, Ealdorman Ordlaf, needed 
to intercede with the king for it to be judged that Helmstan did indeed have the right to 
prove his ownership of Fonthill through a collective oath. Even then Helmstan was in 
trouble, as he was not in a position to make the oath. This could be because unusually 
stringent requirements as to the number or identity of his oath-helpers had been set, but 
we are not told this; all we know is that he, again, had to turn to Ordlaf, and that on this 
occasion the ealdorman exacted a price for his assistance. After the oath had been made, 
presumably with the help of Ordlaf’s clients, Helmstan surrendered the disputed estate at 
Fonthill to Ordlaf and received it back as a life tenancy. There the matter rested until 
Helmstan’s second recorded theft, a year or two later. This time he was caught in the act, 
making off with some untended oxen, but managed to escape capture. He was outlawed 
and therefore forfeited his estates. Helmstan did not flee into exile, however, nor was he 
tracked down and executed. Instead, he made his way to the tomb of King Alfred in 
Winchester and from there, under ecclesiastical protection and again with the help of 
Ordlaf, he was able to petition the king and obtain something close to a pardon. He was 
permitted to return home and retain his goods. Ordlaf was not so generous; rather than 
allow Helmstan back to the Fonthill estate he gave it to the Bishop of Winchester, receiving 
other lands in exchange. 
The Fonthill Letter is famous among early medievalists because it is much more richly 
detailed than other surviving narratives, but in many ways Helmstan’s case is typical. It 
                                                          
43 On these points, see Lambert, Law and Order, 261, 268-74, 283-4. 
44 See, for instance, EHD I, 544-6, 571-3, 575-9 (nos. 102, 118, 120); Robertson, Anglo-Saxon Charters, 90-3, 
128-31 (nos. 44, 63); Brooks and Kelly, Charters of Christ Church Canterbury, 852-62 (no. 104); Baxter, 
“Lordship and Justice”, 410-11. 
45 See EHD I, 544-6 (no. 102); Brooks and Kelly, Charters of Christ Church Canterbury, 852-62 (no. 104); Keynes, 
“The Fonthill Letter”. 
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shows how significant socio-political networks generally, and patron-client relationships 
specifically, could be in manipulating legal outcomes. It also demonstrates a merciful 
tendency in authority figures when dealing with members of their own political community, 
even when their guilt appears undisputed. Our motley collection of case narratives together 
paint a similar picture of politically malleable judicial decision-making and of an elite with no 
great enthusiasm for imposing the death penalty on people from within their own social 
world. Indeed, as Andrew Rabin’s recent review of this material has shown, if we were to 
limit ourselves to case narratives alone it would be difficult to demonstrate that judicial 
executions took place at all.46 In fact, archaeological evidence establishes that they did 
happen, though not with any regularity.47 We cannot be fully certain, but the dynamics of 
the more localized, lower-status communities that conducted their legal affairs in hundred 
assemblies probably mirrored those of aristocratic society. Few if any people at this social 
level had ealdormen for godfathers, but most would have had families living locally and 
virtually all would have had lords—often men of roughly Helmstan’s status—whose local 
political significance rested in large part on their effectiveness as patrons in legal contexts.48 
There is no reason to think minor lords were any less assiduous in supporting their clients 
than Ordlaf was in in Helmstan’s case. Indeed, the laws occasionally show concern that lords 
might be tempted to go too far in shielding their men (an accusation that Ordlaf takes pains 
to forestall in his letter). One case narrative even provides an extreme example of this 
happening in practice: three brothers of roughly Helmstan’s status resorted to violence in 
defence of their client, a man apparently caught in the act of stealing a bridle, and lost 
everything as a result.49  
It thus seems likely that the fact that justice was embedded in communal institutions and 
local political networks proved a formidable barrier to the practical implementation of the 
harsh retributive vision underlying the tenth-century’s long public order campaign. Though 
it is probable that in the abstract people bought into the idea that order could be improved 
through the deterrent effects of increased severity and therefore approved of elite law-
making efforts, when it came to applying these principles to specific individuals all manner 
of additional considerations came into play and legally straightforward decisions became 
morally complex. Wrongful acts that from a disinterested perspective might have 
appeared—to elite and non-elite observers alike—symptomatic of a wider problem with 
order, may often have seemed otherwise to the local men who shaped communal decision-
making. Clear-cut cases of theft, prime candidates for severity in theory, might look more 
justifiable and forgivable when framed as retaliation for previous maltreatment, as the 
collection of a disputed debt, or as an ill-conceived prank born of youthful exuberance. 
                                                          
46 Rabin, “Capital Punishment and the Anglo-Saxon Judicial Apparatus”, 193-9. 
47 See Reynolds, Anglo-Saxon Deviant Burial Customs, but cf. Buckberry, “Osteological Evidence of Corporal 
and Capital Punishment”, 148: “It is quite likely that the corporal and capital punishments in Anglo-Saxon law 
codes constitute a deterrent rather than a reality. Most individuals were fined for their crimes, whereas more 
severe punishments appear to have been meted out infrequently.” 
48 See Baxter, “Lordship and Justice”. 
49 I Æthelred 1:10-1:13 ; II Cnut 31-31:2; EHD I, 571-3 (no. 118). 
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Exactly how it played out in practice we cannot know because we lack sources to show local 
legal practice in detail, but embedded in the laws themselves is a story of law-makers 
struggling, and often failing, to overcome local assemblies’ propensity to leniency. 
For the most part, tenth-century people were thus shielded from the full force of their 
culture’s violent fantasies of retribution and deterrence. The main exceptions would have 
been outsiders—not just people from elsewhere but all those who for some reason found 
themselves isolated from local social and political networks—who would have been 
vulnerable to scapegoating and less able either to defend themselves legally or to appeal to 
the merciful sentiments of those judging them.50 Additionally, there may well have been a 
growing number of centers of elite power, like Lantfred’s Winchester, where law could be 
applied in its full idealistic severity by figures distant from the communities they sought to 
discipline.  
___ 
The lesson I suggest we take from this is not dissimilar to the one offered in William J. 
Stuntz’s Collapse of American Criminal Justice, a work recommended to me as food for 
comparative thought in the later stages of writing my book, and which I found unexpectedly 
fruitful in suggesting new angles from which to approach late Anglo-Saxon mechanisms of 
prosecution and defence.51 In a long historical perspective, it is not unusual for societies 
collectively to adopt simplistic understandings of public order that overemphasise, 
sometimes drastically, how significantly the deterrent effects of retributive sanctions 
contribute to its maintenance. Stuntz’s account of the American experience of the last fifty 
years is a chilling case study of what can happen when a political elite goes to great lengths 
to give practical legal force to such conventional wisdom, creating a punitive apparatus of 
unprecedented efficiency in the ultimately forlorn hope of thereby securing a major 
improvement in order. Tenth-century England is in some respects a good parallel, in that the 
two societies’ political elites show both a similar legislative zeal and a similar ingenuity in 
circumventing inconvenient legal principles in pursuit of their ideals. For instance, both 
societies’ legislators can reasonably be suspected of consciously enshrining 
disproportionately harsh punishments in law so as to incentivize guilty pleas and minimize 
the use of formal proof procedures.52  
                                                          
50 On outsiders, see Lambert, “Hospitality, Protection and Refuge”. 
51 It is perhaps worth stressing that, for me, Stuntz’s book’s is significant as one of a number of comparative 
historical and anthropological case studies that I have found useful in sharpening my thinking about my own 
period. His discussion of criminal justice in the USA thus occupies a similar place to Scheele’s account of 
“anarchy” among the Tubu or Ewart’s explication of human/non-human categorisation among the Panará. 
(See Scheele, “In Praise of Disorder”; Ewart, “Categories and Consequences”.) My purpose in using it here is 
simply to provide a helpful analogy—one that will probably be familiar to many readers of this special issue—
that will make the tentative conclusion offered here clearer. Though I found Stuntz’s book riveting I am 
obviously in no position to pass judgement on its merits as historical interpretation. 
52 Lambert, Law and Order, 286-7; Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 257-60. 
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But on the whole, the tenth-century example is probably a rather closer analogue to 
Stuntz’s account of the way policing and justice were firmly under local democratic control 
in northern cities during America’s “Gilded Age” (c. 1880-1930), an era of low murder rates 
and small prison populations. The fact that the political machines that ran these northern 
cities tended to rely on the votes of the poor immigrant and nonwhite communities who 
bore the brunt of policing made them responsive to those communities’ views, and the 
likelihood that jurors (whose moral assessments of an offender’s deserts were central to 
verdicts in a way that is no longer the case) would be drawn from similar neighbourhoods to 
the accused meant they were more often inclined to sympathize and show mercy.53 More 
than 80% of Chicago women who killed their husbands were acquitted in the period, 
seemingly on the strength of juries’ willingness to grant them rights of self-defence in the 
context of abusive relationships much broader and looser than those enshrined in legal 
doctrine.54 It is hard not to suspect that the long-term inefficacy of King Æthelstan’s 
insistence that all proven thieves be executed reflects local sentiment being woven into 
tenth-century judicial processes in a similar way. 
For Æthelstan, of course, local assemblies’ unwillingness to implement lawmakers’ 
commands was intolerable: he opens the second round of his anti-theft campaign by 
declaring, “my councillors say that I have borne it too long” and then goes on to enact a 
series of measures on local corruption.55 Indeed, it seems likely that a great deal of leniency 
towards well-connected individuals was secured by means that would have appeared 
morally dubious even to contemporaries accustomed to the operation of a political order 
openly based on patronage networks.  The justice system in northern cities during the USA’s 
Gilded Age was corrupt and discriminatory too, as Stuntz acknowledges, but even so he 
argues that “for all its complications and all its vices, … [it] worked better than today’s more 
bureaucratic system, and did so without today’s massive and unstable prison 
populations.”56 Whether the same could be said of tenth-century England is uncertain—we 
have no way of assessing the changing scale of the public order issues that prompted law-
makers’ concerns about theft—but this medieval example does at least help reinforce the 
case that embedding the operation of justice in local communities, despite all the injustices 
it can create, often serves to protect human beings from culturally dominant fantasies of 
violently imposed order. The centralized, professionalized and depersonalized policing and 
justice systems of the modern world, by contrast, are all too capable of turning those 
fantasies into cruel realities. 
 
Tom Lambert 
                                                          
53 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 131-42. 
54 Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 136. If only white women are considered the figure is over 
90%. 
55 V Æthelstan prologue, 1:2-1:4; Gesetze I, 166-8; EHD I, 422-3 (no. 36) 
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